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NO-CITATION RULES UNDER SIEGE:
A BATTLEFIELD REPORT AND ANALYSIS
Stephen R. Barnett*
"The assault upon the citadel of no-citation rules is
proceeding in these days apace." Cardozo didn't exactly say
that,' but if he were here today, he might. "Unpublished" 2
judicial opinions and rules prohibiting their citation are under
attack on several fronts. I report here on three of those venues:
* Elizabeth J. Boalt Professor of Law Emeritus, University of California, Berkeley. I am
grateful to the several judges and numerous court officials who spoke to me for this
Article; to Florence McKnight and Lauren McBrayer (Boalt '05) for superb research
assistance; to Patrick Schiltz for magnanimous consultation; and to Jan Vetter for a helpful
reading of the draft. No one but me is responsible for any of the views expressed here.
1. He said, of course, that the assault upon the "citadel of privity" was proceeding
apace. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441,445 (N.Y. 1931) (Cardozo, C.J.).
2. The term "unpublished" has become a misnomer, inasmuch as the opinions in
question are now posted online by the courts issuing them and are even published in
traditional print in West's Federal Appendix. See Stephen R. Barnett, From Anastasoff to
Hart to West's Federal Appendix: The Ground Shifts under No-Citation Rules, 4 J. App.
Prac. & Process 1, 2-3 (2002). But the designation "unpublished" functions usefully as a
term of art, denoting opinions that the issuing court labels "unpublished." See e.g. 8th Cir.
R. 28A(i) (2003) ("Unpublished decisions are decisions which a court designates for
unpublished status"); infra n. 110.
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(1) the federal circuit courts of appeals, (2) the states, and (3) the
rulemaking process of the federal judiciary. Each has seen
important developments recently. The federal rulemakers, for
their part, currently are receiving public comments on a major
proposed new rule, one that presents significant questions of
drafting as well as of policy.
I. THE FEDERAL CIRCUITS
Among the individual federal circuit courts of appeals, the
major news is from the First Circuit. Effective in December
2002, that court dropped its rule that allowed citation of
unpublished opinions only in "related cases." 3 The First Circuit
adopted instead a rule cautioning that "[c]itation of an
unpublished opinion of this court is disfavored," but allowing
such citation "if (1) the party believes that the opinion
persuasively addresses a material issue in the appeal; and (2)
there is no published opinion from this court that adequately
addresses the issue."4 Further, " [t]he court will consider such
opinions for their persuasive value but not as binding
precedent."5
Grudging as the language may be, this move by the First
Circuit, coming a year after a similar turnabout by the District of
Columbia Circuit,' means that nine of the thirteen circuits now
allow citation of their unpublished opinions. The circuits
permitting citation are the First,7 Third,8 Fourth,9 Fifth,' ° Sixth,"
3. Ist Cir. R. 36(b)(2)(F) (repealed Dec. 16, 2002). "Related cases" are those relevant
under doctrines such as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel, or relevant for
factual purposes such as showing double jeopardy or sanctionable conduct (or appealing
from the opinion in question). See e.g. 9th Cir. R. 36-3(b)(i), (ii). So far as I know, every
American court allows citation of unpublished opinions for related-case purposes; it is hard
to imagine how a court could not do so. This article therefore will generally omit the
omnipresent qualifier, "except for related cases."
4. 1st Cir. R. 32.3(a)(2).
5. Id.
6. See D.C. Cir. R. 28(c)(12)(B); Barnett, supra n. 2, at 3 n. 11.
7. See 1st Cir. R. 32.3(a)(2); supra text at nn. 4-5.
8. Notwithstanding Third Circuit Appellate Rule 1, I.O.P. 5.7 ("The court by tradition
does not cite to its not precedential opinions as authority"), and the Third Circuit Press
Release of December 5, 2001 ("the court will not cite to non-precedential opinions as
authority") (emphasis in original), attorneys in the Third Circuit may and do cite to
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Eighth," Tenth," Eleventh, 4 and D.C. Circuits. Those still
forbidding citation are the Second," Seventh, 7 Ninth,'8 and
Federal' 9 Circuits. Nine of thirteen is a substantial majority;
unpublished opinions. Telephone Interview with Trish Dodszuweit, Leg. Coord., 3d Cir.
(Oct. 30, 2003).
9. See 4th Cir. R. 36(c) (citation of unpublished opinions "disfavored," but "[i]f
counsel believes, nevertheless, that an unpublished disposition ... has precedential value in
relation to a material issue in a case and that there is no published opinion that would serve
as well, such disposition may be cited").
10. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.3 (unpublished opinions issued before January 1, 1996, "are
precedent," but "because every opinion believed to have precedential value is published,"
unpublished opinions "normally" should not be cited); 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4 (unpublished
opinions issued on or after January 1, 1996, are "not precedent"; such opinions "may,
however, be persuasive" and may be cited).
11. See 6th Cir. R. 28(g) (citation of unpublished opinions "disfavored," but "[i]f
counsel believes, nevertheless, that an unpublished disposition ... has precedential value in
relation to a material issue in a case and that there is no published opinion that would serve
as well, such disposition may be cited").
12. See 8th Cir. R. 28(A)(i) (unpublished opinions "are not precedent and parties
generally should not cite them," but parties may do so if the opinion has "persuasive value
on a material issue and no published opinion of this or another court would serve as well").
13. See 10th Cir. R. 36.3 (unpublished decisions "not binding precedents" and their
citation is "disfavored," but unpublished decision may be cited if it has "persuasive value
with respect to a material issue that has not been addressed in a published opinion" and if it
would "assist the court in its disposition" ).
14. See I Ith Cir. R. 36-2 (unpublished opinions "not considered binding precedent"
but may be cited as persuasive authority); see also 1 th Cir. R. 36-3, I.O.P. 5 (" [o]pinions
that the panel believes to have no precedential value are not published," and "[reliance on
unpublished opinions is not favored by the court").
15. D.C. Cir. R. 28(c)(12)(B) (unpublished decisions issued on or after January 1,
2002, "may be cited as precedent"); but cf D.C. Cir. R. 36(c)(2) ("a panel's decision to
issue an unpublished disposition means that the panel sees no precedential value in that
disposition" ).
16. See 2d Cir. R. 0.23 (citation of written statements attached to summary orders
prohibited).
17. See 7th Cir. R. 53(b)(2)(iv) (unpublished orders "shall not be cited or used as
precedent" ).
18. See 9th Cir. R. 36-3 (unpublished dispositions "not binding precedent" and "may
not be cited"). The Ninth Circuit has a provisional exception that allows citation of
unpublished dispositions in petitions for rehearing or rehearing en banc and in requests to
publish opinions, solely for the purpose of showing a conflict between panel opinions. See
id.; Ninth Cir. Notice (Dec. 30, 2002). (This limited exception will be set aside here, and
the Ninth Circuit's policy considered as one that does not allow citation of unpublished
dispositions.)
19. See Fed. Cir. R. 47.6(b) (opinion or order "designated not to be cited as
precedent ... must not be employed or cited as precedent").
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citability of unpublished opinions thus comes close to being the
norm in the federal circuits today. 0
In another federal court development, the Fifth Circuit,
which already allowed its unpublished opinions to be cited, in
July 2003 broke down and joined all but one of the other circuits
in putting those opinions online at the court's website.' That
leaves the Eleventh Circuit as the last holdout refusing to put its
unpublished opinions online. This will have to change in two
years, when the E-Government Act of 200222 takes effect. That
Act requires each circuit to maintain a website affording
access-in a "text searchable format" -to "all written opinions
issued by the court, regardless of whether such opinions are to
be published in the official court reporter." 23
20. One report suggests that the switch to citability-at least when done
prospectively-makes little observable difference. See Jonathan Groner, Circuit's New
Citation Rule: Few Takers, 26 Leg. Times I (Jan. 6, 2003) (D.C. Circuit after year of
experience "has not noticed any problems with lawyers' use of unpublished... rulings. In
fact, the court has hardly noticed any change at all"; D.C. Circuit judge suggests limited
use of new rule reflects its prospective nature, applicable only to unpublished opinions
issued after rule took effect).
21. See Opinions Search Pages of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals (available at
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/Opinions/OpinHome.cfm) (accessed Dec. 11, 2003; copy on
file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process); Telephone Interview with Fritz
Fulbruge, Clerk, U.S. Ct. of App. for 5th Cir. (Aug. 7, 2003). The online opinions are
picked up by West Group for publication in its Federal Appendix. Fulbruge Interview,
supra this note.
22. E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 205(f), 116 Stat. 2899, 2914
(2003).
23. Id. at 2913. Some judges and others have suggested that action by the legislature to
require citability of unpublished opinions might run afoul of the separation of powers. See
e.g. Subcomm. on Cts., the Internet & Intellectual Property, H.R. Jud. Comm.,
Unpublished Judicial Opinions, 107th Cong. 15-16 (June 27, 2002) (testimony of the
Honorable Alex Kozinski) (available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/80454.PDF)
(accessed Dec. 9, 2003; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process)
[hereinafter Kozinski Testimony]. The suggestion is regularly made in California when the
state legislature considers bills that would require citability of appellate court opinions. See
e.g. Cal. Assembly Jud. Comm., Hearings on AB 1165-Appellate Opinions: New
Publication and Citability Rules, 2003-2004 Assembly 6 (May 6, 2003) (available at
http://www.assembly.ca.gov/acs/acsframeset2text.htm) (accessed Dec. 9, 2003; copy on
file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). The E-Government Act-assuming it
is constitutional-would seem relevant here. If Congress can require that unpublished court
of appeal opinions be put online, why could it not require-and why could a state
legislature not require-the alternative form of public access that consists of making the
opinions citable?
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II. THE STATES
A. The Serfass-Cranford Findings and
Judge Kozinski's Testimony
It may not have attracted much attention, but there is a lot
going on in the states. State activity with respect to citation of
unpublished opinions tends to draw little national notice; not
only are there some four times as many states as federal circuits
to take into account, but the states differ in their court systems
and in the kinds of "opinions" their courts issue. Some states
have no intermediate appellate courts, and hence, no
unpublished opinions of those courts. In some states, the
supreme court issues unpublished opinions. Some states have no
unpublished opinions but do have unpublished dispositions
without opinion. Further, a state's "rule" with respect to citing
unpublished opinions may not be easy to find, existing as it
sometimes does in caselaw (not always clear and consistent) or
even in custom.
Merely to collect, let alone to classify and compare, the
rules of all the states is therefore a substantial undertaking.
Pioneers in the task were Melissa M. Serfass and Jessie L.
Cranford, who reported their results in this Journal in 2001 .24 In
June 2002, the Serfass-Cranford study was relied on by Judge
Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit in testimony he gave before a
subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee. 5 Judge
Kozinski produced a chart counting and classifying the rules of
all the states as reported by Serfass and Cranford.26
As a gauge of the trend in the states, it may be instructive to
compare the situation that prevailed some two and one-half
years ago, as reported by Serfass and Cranford and Judge
Kozinski, with the situation prevailing today. I propose first to
do this, in order to identify the changes that have taken place
recently. Then I will integrate the most recent data into a
complete survey of today's state rules on citing unpublished
24. Melissa M. Serfass & Jessie L. Cranford, Federal and State Court Rules Governing
Publication and Citation of Opinions, 3 J. App. Prac. & Process 251 (2001).
25. Kozinski Testimony, supra n. 23, at 15.
26. Id. at 18-19.
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opinions, updating and revising the work of Serfass and
Cranford.
B. Judge Kozinski's Report Compared with the Situation Today
In his statement to the House Judiciary subcommittee,
Judge Kozinski, a champion of no-citation rules, 7 defended
those rules with his usual force, pungency, and wit. Judge
Kozinski said nothing about the then-existing rule count in the
federal courts. (Eight of the thirteen circuits allowed citation of
unpublished opinions, a figure since increased to nine of
thirteen.") Instead, Judge Kozinski looked to the states for
numerical help. 29 He asked, "Are Federal Courts Unique in
Prohibiting Citation to Unpublished Decisions?" and answered,
"[E]mphatically no."30 For this, Judge Kozinski cited the "very
revealing" findings of Serfass and Cranford, which showed that
"[t]he vast majority of state court systems restrict citation to
unpublished decisions." 3' Specifically, Judge Kozinski
calculated from the Serfass-Cranford findings that thirty-eight
states (plus the District of Columbia) "restrict citation to
unpublished opinions to some degree."32 And, he continued,
" [B]y far the largest number (35) have a mandatory prohibition
phrased much like the Ninth Circuit's rule." 33
In comparing the Serfass-Cranford-Kozinski findings with
the situation today,34 the striking fact is that in the two and one-
half years since those findings were compiled, six states have
27. See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2001) (court's opinion authored by
Kozinski, J.); see also Alex Kozinski & Stephen Reinhardt, Please Don't Cite This! 20 Cal.
Law. 43 (June 2000).
28. See supra pp. 474-75.
29. "The state courts, of course, hear vastly more cases in the aggregate than do the





34. This comparison is aided by the research into state and federal citation rules
reported in McCoy v. State, 59 P.3d 747, 753 (Alaska App. 2002) (Mannheimer, J., opinion
on rehearing), republished at __ P.3d -, 2002 WL 32332961 (Alaska App. Oct 04,
2002); see also Jason B. Binimow, Precedential Effect of Unpublished Opinions, 105
A.L.R.5th 499 (2003).
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switched from not allowing citation of unpublished opinions -
what Judge Kozinski calls a "mandatory prohibition" 36-to
allowing it. Three of those states now permit citation of
unpublished opinions as "precedent": Texas," Utah," and West
Virginia." The other three permit it for "persuasive" value: 40
Alaska,4' Iowa,42 and Kansas.43  A seventh state, Ohio, has
35. I use the term "unpublished opinions" here to encompass all forms of opinions,
orders, or other dispositions by a state's appellate courts that are regarded as
"unpublished" or unreported.
36. Kozinski Testimony, supra n. 23, at 15.
37. On January 1, 2003, Texas, which had prohibited citation of its unpublished court
of appeals opinions, discontinued the category of unpublished opinions in civil cases and
made all new civil-case opinions citable without restriction. Tex. R. App. P. 47.7; see
Dorsaneo & Soules' Texas Rules Ann., Tex. R. App. P. 47, Comment to 2002 Change
(Lexis 2003). Prior unpublished opinions "have no precedential value," but are citable.
Tex. R. App. P. 47.7. Unpublished criminal-case opinions are still uncitable. Tex. R. App.
P. 47.2(b), 77.3.
38. See Grand Co. v. Rogers, 44 P.3d 734, 738 (Utah 2002) (striking down "no
citation" rule promulgated by Utah Judicial Council; unpublished opinions of court of
appeals "are equally binding upon lower courts of this state, and may be cited to the degree
that they are useful, authoritatively and persuasively"; such decisions, "although not
'officially published,' may be presented as precedential authority to a lower court or as
persuasive authority to this court, so long as all parties and the court are supplied with
accurate copies at the time the decision is first cited" ).
39. See Walker v. Doe, 558 S.E.2d 290, 296 (W. Va. 2001) (" a per curiam opinion [of
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals] may be cited in support of a legal
argument" ; the court "renounce[s] any prior statements of this Court to the effect that per
curiam opinions are not legal precedent").
40. Jurisdictions that allow citation of unpublished opinions as "precedent" also allow
it, of course, for the lesser effect of "persuasive" value. These "persuasive value" states
therefore might more accurately be described as allowing citation "only" for persuasive
value. I omit the "only" as a shorthand device.
41. See McCoy v. State, 59 P.3d 747, 753-760 (Alaska App. 2002) (interprets Alaska's
Appellate Rule 214(d), providing that unpublished opinions "may not be cited in the courts
of this state," as meaning that they may not be cited "as precedent," and not as forbidding
judges and lawyers "from relying on unpublished decisions for whatever persuasive power
those decisions might have"). Judge Kozinski in his congressional testimony ironically
cited Alaska's Rule 214 as "typical" of the "mandatory prohibition" of citation that he
found in many states. Kozinski Testimony, supra n. 23, at 15.
42. Iowa rules prohibiting citation of unpublished opinions were replaced on February
15, 2002, by Iowa Appellate Rule 6.14 (5)(b). The new rule provides that an unpublished
opinion of any appellate court "may be cited in a brief," but it "shall not constitute
controlling legal authority." Id.
43. Kansas Supreme Court Rule 7.04, barring citation of unpublished opinions, was
amended on February 7, 2003. The amended rule provides that "unpublished memorandum
opinions of any court or agency," while "not binding precedents" and "not favored for
citation," nonetheless "may be cited if they have persuasive value with respect to a
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switched from allowing citation for persuasive value to allowing
it for whatever weight is deemed appropriate by the court.44
In addition, two states that still prohibit citation currently
have before their supreme courts proposed rule changes that
would allow citation for persuasive value: Hawaii" and Illinois.
The possibility thus exists that eight states will have moved out
of the "no citation" column since Judge Kozinski compiled his
data.
C. Classifying and Counting the States
Classifying the states with respect to their positions on
citing unpublished opinions can be difficult, for reasons I have
suggested. Not only are the facts often murky, but the bottom-
line decision often involves a judgment call that could go either
way. Indeed, I count five states as having a foot in both camps
material issue not addressed in a published opinion of a Kansas appellate court and they
would assist the court in its disposition." Id.
44. The Ohio Supreme Court Rules for the Reporting of Opinions had provided
(former Rule 2(G)) that unpublished decisions of Ohio's courts were not controlling
authority but could be cited as persuasive. In May 2002, Rule 2(G) was superseded by a
revised Rule 4. Rule 4(A) now provides that "distinctions between 'controlling' and
'persuasive' opinions of the courts of appeals based merely upon whether they have been
published in the Ohio Official Reports are abolished"; Rule 4(B) states that all court of
appeal opinions issued after the effective date of the new rules "may be cited as legal
authority and weighted as deemed appropriate by the courts."
45. The Hawaii Supreme Court currently has before it a proposal to amend Rule 35 of
the Hawaii Rules of Appellate Procedure to allow citation to unpublished appellate
opinions for their "persuasive value." Comments were due in the Supreme Court by
December 29, 2003. News Release, Hawaii Jud. Pub. Affairs Off., Comment Wanted on
Proposed Amendment to Hawai'i Rules of Appellate Procedure (Mar. 25, 2003) (available
at http://www.courts.state.hi.us) (accessed Dec. I, 2003; copy on file with Journal of
Appellate Practice and Process); see State v. Uyesugi, 60 P.3d 843, 874 (Haw. 2002)
(Acoba, J., concurring) (discussing proposal).
46. The Illinois Supreme Court in February 2003 appointed a special committee to
study Supreme Court Rule 23. See Press Release, Supreme Court Forms Committee to
Study Rule 23 (Feb. 27, 2003) (available at http://www.state.il.us/court/PressRel
/2003/031403.pdf) (accessed Dec. 10, 2003; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice
and Process). That Rule bars citation of unpublished opinions, including both "written
orders" and "summary orders." Ill. S. Ct. R. 23(e). The committee has recommended that
unpublished written orders henceforth issued be citable as "persuasive authority." See
Letter from Justice Thomas R. Appleton, Comm. Co-Chair, to author, Proposed
Amendments, Ill. S. Ct. R. 23(e) (Nov. 17, 2003) (on file with author). The Illinois Supreme
Court has referred the proposal to the court's Rules Committee, which is expected to
consider it in 2004. Telephone Interview with Patricia C. Bobb, Esq., Chair, Rules Comm.,
II1. S. Ct. (Nov. 20, 2003).
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and thus being "too close to call" -although that call, too, is
arguable. Nonetheless, I have grouped the states into five
categories, as follows (in order of declining citability):
1. No Unpublished Opinions or No Rule against Citation
This category contains four states: Connecticut,
4
Mississippi,48 New York,49 and North Dakota. °
2. States That Allow Citation of Unpublished Opinions as
"Precedent"
In this category I count five states: Delaware,
5 ' Ohio, 52
Texas,53 Utah,54 and West Virginia.55
47. In Connecticut, all case dispositions by both the supreme court and the appellate
court are published. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-212(b) (West 2003) (supreme court); Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 51-215a(b) (West 2003) (appellate court). Unpublished opinions that may
issue from trial courts or courts in other jurisdictions are covered by Conn. R. App. P. 67-9,
which provides that they may be cited if a copy is provided to the court and opposing
counsel. Telephone interview with Cynthia Gworek, Asst. Clerk, Conn. S. Ct. (Aug. 15,
2003). (Statutes or rules that allow citation of unpublished opinions very commonly require
that a copy of the opinion be provided to the court and opposing counsel; henceforth such
"provide a copy" requirements generally will not be mentioned in describing citation
rules.)
48. All opinions of the Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeal issued on or
after November 1, 1998, are published and hence may be cited; in addition, there is no law
or rule that prohibits or limits citation of these opinions. Telephone Interview with Jack
Pool, Dir. of C. Leg. Staff, Miss. S. Ct. (Aug. 27, 2003). Although the rules provide that
unpublished opinions issued before November 1, 1998, are not citable, Miss. R. App. P.
35-A(b) (supreme court); Miss. R. App. P. 35-B(b) (court of appeals), in practice the
supreme court entertains citation of those opinions and considers them on their persuasive
merits, Pool Interview, supra this note. See e.g. McBride v. Jones, 803 So. 2d 1168, 1170,
1171 (Miss. 2002) (McRae, J., dissenting) (majority and dissent both cite unpublished
opinion and debate its merits).
49. In New York, all opinions of the court of appeals and the appellate division are
published. Trial court and appellate term opinions sometimes are not published. There is no
law or rule that limits or prohibits the citation of unpublished opinions. Telephone
Interview with Marjorie McCoy, Dep. Clerk, N.Y. Ct. of App. (Aug. 15, 2003); Telephone
Interview with Gary Spivey, N.Y. St. Rptr. (Aug. 15, 2003).
50. The North Dakota Supreme Court issues some "summary dispositions," which
consist of one or two paragraphs and avoid stating the facts. See N.D. R. App. P. 35.1.
These are posted on the court's website and may be cited, as there is no law or rule that
says they may not be. The same is true of opinions issued by the sporadically sitting North
Dakota Court of Appeals. Telephone Interviews with Penny Miller, Clerk of N.D. S. Ct.
(Aug. 18, 2003; Aug. 26, 2003).
51. Delaware's Supreme Court Rule 17(a) was amended in 1983 "to permit unreported
orders of the Delaware Supreme Court to be cited as precedent." Del. Sup. Ct. R.I.O.P.
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3. States That Allow Citation for "Persuasive Value"
In this category I count twelve states: Alaska, 6 Iowa,57
Kansas," Michigan, New Mexico, 0  Tennessee, Vermont,"
61 65Wyoming, Virginia, 64 Minnesota, 6 New Jersey,66 and Georgia.67
X(8); see New Castle County v. Goodman, 461 A.2d 1012, 1013 (Del. 1983) (citing rule
change and distinguishing unreported decision relied on).
52. See supra n. 44.
53. See supra n. 37.
54. See supra n. 38.
55. See supra n. 39.
56. See supra n. 41.
57. See supra n. 42.
58. See supra n. 43.
59. Michigan's Court Rule 7.215(C) states that an unpublished opinion "is not
precedentially binding under the rule of stare decisis," but goes on," [a] party who cites an
unpublished opinion must provide a copy" -making clear that citation is allowed.
60. New Mexico's Appellate Rule 12-405(C) bars citing unpublished opinions "as
precedent in any court." But the New Mexico Court of Appeals has ruled, "[I]f counsel
concludes that language in a memorandum opinion or calendar notice is persuasive, we see
no reason why it cannot be presented to the court for consideration. It would be more
appropriate to present the language without reference to its source, so that the court to
which it is presented is asked to consider it on its own merits, rather than as precedent or
controlling authority." State v. Gonzales, 794 P.2d 361, 370-371 (N.M. App. 1990).
61. See Tenn. S. Ct. R. 4(H)(1) (unpublished opinions "persuasive authority");
McConnell v. State, 12 S.W.3d 795, 799 n. 5 (Tenn. 2000) ('persuasive force"); State v.
Kelley, 2002 WL 927610 at *17 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 21, 2002) (unpublished)
(" persuasive authority only").
62. See Vt. R. App. P. 33.1(c) (unpublished order "may be cited as persuasive authority
but shall not be considered as controlling precedent").
63. Although "abbreviated opinions" of the Wyoming Supreme Court are not
published and "shall not constitute precedent of the appellate court," Wyo. R. App. P.
9.06, Wyoming has no rule against citing unpublished opinions, and they can be cited for
persuasive value, Telephone Interview with Judy Pacheco, Clerk, Wyo. S. Ct. (Aug. 11,
2003).
64. See Fairfax County Sch. Bd. v. Rose, 509 S.E.2d 525, 528 n. 3 (Va. App. 1999)
("Although an unpublished opinion of the Court has no precedential value, a court or the
commission does not err by considering the rationale and adopting it to the extent it is
persuasive.") (citation omitted); accord Johnson v. Paul Johnson Plastering & Natl. Sur.
Corp., 561 S.E.2d 40, 45 n. 7 (Va. App. 2002); but see Grajales v. Commonwealth, 353
S.E.2d 789, 791 n. I (Va. App. 1987) (unpublished memorandum decisions of court of
appeals "not to be cited or relied upon as precedent"); Robdau v. Commonwealth, 543
S.E.2d 602, 604 n. 4 (Va. App. 2001) (refusing to consider unpublished case). As these
decisions indicate, the judges of the court of appeals are split on considering unpublished
opinions for persuasive value; "it depends on which judge you get." Telephone Interview
with Marty Ring, Dep. Clerk of Va. App. Ct. (Aug. 25, 2003). The unreceptive judges,
however, pose no risk of sanctions-only that the cited case won't be considered. Id.
(Given this fact, as well as the apparent willingness of the courts in the majority of recent
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4. States Too Close to Call
Some states seem in equipoise between allowing citation
and forbidding it. For example, they may have conflicting
practices for different classes of unpublished opinions. Also
included here are the two states, Illinois and Hawaii, that are
considering proposals to reverse their rules and allow citation. I
therefore classify five states as on the fence: Hawaii,68 Illinois,69
Maine,7° Oklahoma,7' and Oregon.72
cases to consider the cited opinions, I am classifying Virginia as a state that allows citation
for persuasive value.)
65. Rule 136.01(b) of Minnesota's Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure provides that
unpublished opinions "are not precedential ... and may be cited only as provided" in
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 480A.08(3). That statute says unpublished opinions "must not be cited
unless" a copy is provided to opposing counsel. Id. Minnesota courts understandably have
interpreted this statute as allowing citation for persuasive value. See Dynamic Air, Inc. v.
Bloch, 502 N.W.2d 796, 800-801 (Minn. App. 1993); State v. Rosillo, 2001 WL 881279 at
**3-5 (Minn. App. July 31, 2001) (unpublished).
66. The New Jersey Courts' Rules of General Application, Rule 1:36-3, provides that
unpublished opinions shall not "constitute precedent" or "be cited by any court." This rule
is regularly ignored, with unpublished opinions commonly cited and considered for their
persuasive value. See e.g. Benjamin Moore & Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 2003 WL
1904383 at *6 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Jan. 14, 2003) (unpublished) (" [p]laintiff relies on an
unpublished opinion," which court cites and distinguishes); Creskill Bd. of Educ. v.
Creskill Educ. Assn., 826 A.2d 778, 783 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2003) (unpublished opinion
"not precedential and is distinguishable on its facts"); accord Telephone Interview with
Paula Schlosser, Admin. Specialist, N.J. S. Ct. (Aug. 12, 2003) (unpublished cases
regularly cited despite rule).
67. Georgia Appellate Court Rule 33(b) says unreported opinions of court of appeals
are not precedents. But "there is no rule against" citing them for persuasive value, and that
is done, though infrequently. Telephone Interview with William L. Martin III, Clerk, Ga.
Ct. App. (Aug. 18, 2003).
68. See supra n. 45 and accompanying text.
69. See supra n. 46 and accompanying text.
70. Maine has an Administrative Order of the Supreme Judicial Court which states that
unpublished memorandum decisions and summary orders of that court may not be cited
"as precedent." S. Jud. Ct. of Me., New Citation Form (Aug. 20, 1996). But the court's
clerk reports that lawyers do cite such decisions and orders, without incurring sanctions; "it
depends on how bold the attorney is." Telephone Interview with James C. Chute, Clerk, S.
Jud. Ct. of Me. (Aug. 11, 2003).
71. Oklahoma has conflicting rules for its supreme court (civil cases) and its court of
criminal appeals. Unpublished opinions of the supreme court are not precedential and may
not be cited. Okla. S. Ct. R. 1.200(b)(5)-(8); Telephone Interview with Michael Richie,
Clerk, Okla. S. Ct., App. Cts., & Ct. of Crim. App. (Aug. 18, 2003). Unpublished opinions
of the court of criminal appeals are "not binding" on that court, but may be cited to it,
"provided counsel states that no published case would serve as well." Okla. Ct. Crim. App.
R. 3.5(C)(3); Richie Interview, supra this note. (It might be said that if Oklahoma is on the
fence, as I have classified it, so is Texas; Texas now allows citation of unpublished civil
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5. No-Citation States
That leaves what Judge Kozinski calls "mandatory
prohibition" states, in which citation is forbidden (except, of
course, for related cases). Relying on the Serfass-Cranford data,
Judge Kozinski counted thirty-five such states.73 I now count
twenty-five: Alabama, 4  Arizona," Arkansas,76  California,77
Colorado,7" District of Columbia,79 Florida,80 Idaho,8' Indiana,82
Kentucky, 3 Louisiana,14 Maryland," Massachusetts,86 Missouri,87
Montana,8 Nebraska, 9 Nevada,90 New Hampshire, 9' North
cases but not of criminal ones, while Oklahoma does the opposite. The situation in Texas,
however, represents a dramatic recent change of policy by an important state.)
72. In Oregon, all opinions of both the supreme court and the court of appeals are
published, and therefore citable. But decisions "affirmed without opinion" -or, in a recent
development, reversed without opinion-by the court of appeals may not be cited. Or. R.
App. P. 5.20(5); Telephone Interviews with Mary Bauman, Ed., Or. Reps. (Aug. 15, 2003;
Oct. 30, 2003).
73. See supra text accompanying n. 33; Kozinski Testimony, supra n. 23, at 12, 17-20.
74. Ala. R. App. P. 53(d).
75. Ariz. S. Ct. R. 11 (c); Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 28(c). But, as in the Ninth Circuit,
memorandum decisions may be cited to show a conflict. See supra n. 18.
76. Ark. S. Ct. & Ct. App. R. 5-2(d).
77. Cal. R. Ct. 977.
78. Colorado Ct. App., Policy of the Court Concerning Citation of Unpublished
Opinions (Apr. 2, 1994) (reprinted in 23 Colo. Law. 1548 (July 1994)).
79. D.C. Ct. App. R. 28(h).
80. The Florida Supreme Court has ruled that per curiam affirmances without written
opinion have no precedential value and should not be cited to a court, except that they may
be cited to the court that issued the decision. Dept. of Leg. Affairs v. Dist. Ct. of App., 434
So. 2d 310, 312-333 (Fla. 1983).
81. Idaho S. Ct. Internal R. 15(f) (copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and
Process).
82. Ind. R. App. P. 65(D).
83. Ky. R. Civ. P. 76.28(4)(c).
84. La. Unif. R. Ct. App. 2-16.3.
85. Md. R. App. Rev. 8-114(b).
86. Horner v. Boston Edison Co., 695 N.E.2d 1093, 1094 (Mass. App. 1998).
87. Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 84.16(b).
88. Mont. Internal Op. R. § I(3)(c) (1996) (available at http://www.lawlibrary.state
.mt.us/dscgi/ds.py/Get/File-6441/MontanaSupremeCourtRules.pdf) (accessed Dec. 16,
2003; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
89. Neb. S. Ct. R. 2(E)(4) (available at http://court.nol.org/rules/pracproc.htm)
(accessed Dec. 16, 2003; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
90. Nev. S. Ct. R. 123.
91. N.H. S. Ct. R. 12-D(3); N.H. S. Ct. R. 25(5).
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Carolina,92  Pennsylvania, 93  Rhode Island,94  South Carolina, 95
South Dakota,96 Washington,97 and Wisconsin.98 Because my
count includes four states that Judge Kozinski did not include,99
there are fourteen states that are counted as no-citation by Judge
Kozinski but removed from that column by me, on the basis
either of intervening events or of further research.'°°
D. Summary
A summary of my results is shown in the table in the
Appendix. Setting aside the five fence-sitters, I find four states
that have either no unpublished opinions or no rule against
citation; five states that allow citation of unpublished opinions
as precedents; and twelve states that allow citation for
persuasive value. That adds up to twenty-one states in which
citation is permitted, as compared with the twenty-five states in
which it is forbidden. This slim margin would not appear to
make the no-citation states today "by far the largest number," as
Judge Kozinski reported that they were in 2002.'' Nor would it
seem accurate to say today that "[t]he vast majority of state
92. N.C. R. App. P. 30(e)(3) (available at http://www.aoc.state.nc.us/www/public
/html/pdf/redrules.pdf) (accessed Dec. 16, 2003; copy on file with Journal of Appellate
Practice and Process).
93. Pa. R. Cmmw. Ct. I.O.P. § 414; Pa. R. Super Ct. I.O.P. 65.37(A); accord U.S. v.
Saunders, 29 Fed. Appx. 78 (3d Cir.) (unreported), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1071 (2002); but
see Commonwealth v. Booth, 729 A.2d 1187, 1189 (Pa. Super. 1999) ("while we consider
the arguments made in [unpublished case], we are not bound to follow it").
94. R.I. S. Ct. R. 16(h).
95. S.C. App. Ct. R. 220(a); S.C. App. Ct. R. 239(d)(2).
96. S.D. Codified Laws § 15-26A-87.I(E) (2001).
97. Wash. R. App. P. 10.4(h).
98. Wis. Stat. § 809.23(3) (Supp. 2003); see Tamminen v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 327
N.W.2d 55, 67 (Wis. 1982) (monetary sanction imposed; "violations of the noncitation rule
will not be tolerated").
99. Florida, see supra n. 80; North Carolina, see supra n. 92; Pennsylvania, see supra
n. 93; and South Carolina, see supra n. 95.
100. The fourteen are Alaska, supra n. 41; Georgia, supra n. 67; Hawaii, supra n. 45;
Illinois, supra n. 46; Iowa, supra n. 42; Kansas, supra n. 43; Maine, supra n. 70;
Mississippi, supra n. 48; New Jersey, supra n. 66; New Mexico, supra n. 60; Oklahoma,
supra n. 71; Tennessee, supra n. 61; Texas, supra n. 37; Utah, supra n. 38.
101. Kozinski Testimony, supra n. 23, at 15.
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court systems restrict citation to unpublished decisions,""' or
that "the overwhelming majority of states have adopted a
prohibition against citation." ,
03
In place of that "vast" and "overwhelming" majority, the
two camps today, numbering twenty-five and twenty-one' states,
seem roughly equal. Moreover, the states allowing citation
include populous ones such as New York, Ohio, Texas,
Michigan, New Jersey, Virginia, and Georgia. (Indeed,
comparing New York and Texas on the one hand with California
on the other, one has to wonder how New York can operate its
court system with no unpublished opinions from either the court
of appeals or the appellate division and no rules against citing
the unpublished opinions that it has;' °4 or how Texas in 2003
could make all its civil appellate opinions citable; °5 while
California, in contrast, issues ninety-three percent of its court of
appeal opinions "unpublished" and refuses to allow their
citation. 0  If these other populous states can decide their
intermediate appellate cases with citable opinions, why can't
California? 107)
102. Id. (unless the term "restrict" includes states that permit citation for persuasive
value but not as precedent, or states that discourage or disfavor citation of unpublished
opinions but allow it). See infra pp. 489-94.
103. Kozinski Testimony, supra n. 23, at 13.
104. See supra n. 49.
105. See supra n. 37.
106. Cal. Jud. Council, 2003 Court Statistics Report 31, tbl. 9 (Admin. Off. of Cts.
2003) (showing percentage of majority opinions published by courts of appeal) (available
at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/documents/csr2003.pdf) (accessed Dec. 10, 2003;
copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process) [hereinafter 2003 Court
Statistics]; Cal. R. Ct. 977(a).
107. California's addiction to unpublished opinions may reflect habits of undue leisure
on the part of the state's court of appeal justices. One judge who sat for twenty-one years
on that court reported that "too many appellate court justices viewed the court as a kind of
retirement." Craig Anderson, Front-Row Seat at the Rerun, S.F. Daily J. I (Dec. 19, 2002)
(profile of former justice Marcel Pochd). The average number of published opinions
produced annually by justices of the California Court of Appeal, in the latest year reported,
was nine. See 2003 Court Statistics, supra n. 106, at 20, tbl. I (total written opinions of
courts of appeal 12,056, and full-time judge equivalents 92.7); id. at 31, tbl. 9 (seven
percent of opinions published, producing 844 published opinions). It may be asked whether
the public is getting its money's worth from appellate judges who produce, on average,
well under one citable opinion per month. (The average number of unpublished opinions
per judge was 121. See id. But unpublished opinions are more likely to be delegated
entirely to staff and not to trouble the judge.)
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Whatever the roll call of states between the two camps
today, the important thing is the trend. It is unmistakable. Since
the Serfass-Cranford data were published in spring 2001, six
states have switched from banning citation to allowing it; two
more states are considering proposals to do the same; and no
state during this period appears to have switched the other way.
This clear trend among the states-like that among the federal
circuits'°8-is significant not only in its own right. Just as Judge
Kozinski argued that a supposed "overwhelming" state
preference for no-citation rules showed such rules to be "an
important tool in managing the development of a coherent body
of caselaw," 09 so the present trend in the states away from no-
citation rules demonstrates something. It shows an increasing
recognition by state courts that they can make their opinions
citable without impairing performance of their judicial function.
The sky does not fall.
III. FEDERAL COURT RULEMAKING
A. Introduction: The Proposed Rule
The weightiest attack on no-citation rules may come from
the rulemaking power of the federal judiciary. In May 2003, the
U.S. Judicial Conference's Advisory Committee on Appellate
Rules approved a proposed new Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure, FRAP Rule 32.1, that would require all federal
circuits to allow citation of their unpublished opinions." ° The
108. See supra nn. 4-21.
109. Kozinski Testimony, supra n. 23, at 15.
110. See Memorandum from Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chair of Advisory Comm. on
App. Rules, to Judge Anthony J. Scirica, Chair of Standing Comm. on Rules of Prac. &
Proc., Report of Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules 27-36 (May 22, 2003) (proposed
Rule at 28-29; Committee Note at 29-36) (available at http://www.uscourts.gov
/rules/app0803.pdf) (accessed Nov. 3, 2003; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice
and Process) [hereinafter Alito Memorandum]. The Advisory Committee's vote was seven
to one, with one abstention.
The committee defines "unpublished," clumsily but workably, as a "term of art"
denoting judicial dispositions "that have been designated as 'unpublished,' 'not for
publication,' 'non-precedential,' 'not precedent,' or the like." Alito Memorandum, supra
this note, at 29. Somewhat compulsively, the committee proceeds to put the ubiquitous
term "unpublished" in quotation marks throughout its Memorandum. See e.g. id. at 30
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proposed Rule was put out for public comment with a deadline
of February 16, 2004;... it could take effect, at the earliest, in
December 2005.2'"
The proposed Rule 32.1 reads in part:
Rule 32.1: Citation of Judicial Dispositions
a) Citation Permitted. No prohibition or restriction may be
imposed upon the citation of judicial opinions, orders,
judgments, or other written dispositions that have been
designated as "unpublished," "not for publication," "non-
precedential," "not precedent," or the like, unless that
prohibition or restriction is generally imposed upon the
citation of all judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or other
written dispositions."
4
As one who believes that judicial opinions by their nature
should be citable, I applaud the committee's development of this
proposed Rule. The committee rightly points out that the
conflicting citation rules of the various circuits "create a
hardship for practitioners," especially because citing an
"uncitable" opinion can bring sanctions or professional
discipline."- The committee is also correct, I believe, in
(proposed rule "says nothing about what effect a court must give to one of its
,unpublished' opinions or to the 'unpublished' opinions of another court").
11. See Memorandum to the Bench, Bar, and Public on Proposed Amendments to the
Federal Rules (available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/memo0803.pdf) (accessed Dec.
12, 2003; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). Public hearings by
the Advisory Committee were scheduled for Los Angeles on January 20, 2004, and
Washington, D.C., on January 26, 2004. Id.
112. The Rule and any comments received will be considered by the Advisory
Committee at its spring 2004 meeting. If approved there (with or without modification), the
Rule then would have to run the gauntlet of the Standing Committee on Rules (June 2004),
the Judicial Conference itself (September 2004), the Supreme Court (by May 1, 2005), and
the Congress, before possibly taking effect-if still standing-on December 1, 2005.
113. Part (b) of the proposed Rule provides that a party who cites an unpublished
opinion that is "not available in a publicly accessible electronic database" must file and
serve a copy of the opinion along with the brief or other paper in which it is cited.
Memorandum to the Bench, Bar, and Public on Proposed Amendments to the Federal
Rules, supra n. I 11. As noted earlier (supra n. 47), such "provide a copy" requirements
exist in most jurisdictions where citation of unpublished opinions is allowed; in the
following discussion they will generally be taken for granted and not mentioned.
114. Alito Memorandum, supra n. 110, at 28-29. A colleague, on encountering this
language, thought it so dense and awkward as to need a translation.
115. See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1180 (9th Cir. 2001) (sanctions not imposed
because of good-faith constitutional challenge); Tamminen v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 327
N.W.2d 55, 67 (Wis. 1982) (sanction imposed).
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concluding that no-citation rules are "wrong as a policy
matter." 116 In principle, then, the proposed Rule 32.1, in my
view, deserves the profession's support.
The way the Rule is presently drafted, however, launches a
cascade of questions. I propose to explore these questions and to
offer an alternative draft of the Rule (which I'll call "Draft B").
B. Citation and the Weight Given Citation
Perhaps the most conspicuous question raised by the
proposed Rule 32.1-or by any rule authorizing citation of
unpublished opinions-is the weight to be given to the cited
opinions. May they be regarded as "precedents," possibly even
binding precedents, or only as "persuasive" authority? And who
is to decide this question-the Judicial Conference of the United
States (overseen by Congress and the Supreme Court), through a
national rule, or the individual circuits through their local rules?
There is a case for national uniformity in the weight given
unpublished opinions. The nine federal circuits that presently
allow citation of unpublished opinions are divided almost evenly
in the weight they accord those citations. ' 7 If one of the goals of
116. Alito Memorandum, supra n. 110, at 27. The committee further observes, "[lI]t is
difficult to justify a system that permits parties to bring to a court's attention virtually every
written or spoken word in existence except those contained in the court's own
'unpublished' opinions." Id. at 33 (emphasis in original). This seems overstated; parties are
barred from telling a court, for example, about facts outside the record. See e.g. R. S. Ct.
U.S. 24-6 ("A brief shall be concise ... and free of irrelevant, immaterial, or scandalous
matter. The Court may disregard or strike a brief that does not comply with this
paragraph") (available at http://supremecourtus.gov/rulesofthecourt.pdf) (accessed Dec.
30, 2003; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). What can be said is
that a prior judicial decision, under our system of law based on precedent, is a special kind
of information that attorneys have a specially strong claim-arguably a constitutional
claim-to be able to disclose to a court when they think it will aid their client's case. Cf
Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velasquez, 531 U.S. 533, 545 (2001) (congressional ban on use of
Legal Services Corporation funds to challenge welfare laws violates First Amendment as
attempt to "prohibit the analysis of certain legal issues and to truncate presentation to the
courts" ).
117. In five circuits, the First, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, and-with respect to opinions
issued on or after January 1, 1996-the Fifth, unpublished opinions may be cited not as
"precedents," but only for "persuasive" value. See supra nn. 4, 10, 12-14. In four circuits,
the Fourth, Sixth, D.C., and-with respect to opinions issued before January 1, 1996-the
Fifth, such opinions may also be cited as "precedent" (or for "precedential value"). See
supra nn. 6, 9-11. In the Third Circuit the opinions simply may be cited, with no weight
specified in the rule. See supra n. 8.
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Rule 32.1 is to unify divergent citation rules of the circuits, '8
that goal arguably applies as much to weight as to citability.
On the question of weight, though, the value of uniformity
does not seem strong enough to overrule circuit choice. There
are compelling considerations of judicial integrity, constitutional
rights, and public policy that make it "wrong as a pGlicy matter"
to prohibit citation of judicial opinions. No equally forceful
arguments require the cited opinions to be accorded any
particular weight, whether "precedential" or only
"persuasive."" ' If nothing else, the considerable variation in
circuit practice probably makes it too soon to impose a uniform
rule.
The Advisory Committee apparently agrees. The
committee is at pains to make clear that its proposed Rule "says
nothing whatsoever about the effect that a court must give" to
an unpublished opinion.'2 " The one and only issue addressed by
proposed Rule 32.1 is the ability of parties to cite opinions
designated as 'unpublished' or 'non-precedential,"' the
committee states.21
C. "Restrictions" on Citation: Introducing Draft B
Despite this assurance, under the present drafting it is not
clear that the proposed Rule 32.1 does preserve circuit choice on
the question of citation weight. When the proposed Rule says,
"No prohibition or restriction may be imposed upon the citation
of [unpublished] judicial opinions," what does "restriction"
118. See Alito Memorandum, supra n. 110, at 35. ("Attorneys will no longer have to
pick through the conflicting no-citation rules of the circuits in which they practice .... ).
119. The "precedential" camp does claim the imprimatur of Article Ill. See Anastasoff
v. U.S., 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (en
banc). But that camp is a minority among the circuits (though a slim one) and does not
seem likely, at least for a good while, to obtain Judicial Conference endorsement in
preference to the "persuasive" approach. See supra n. 117. Moreover, the concepts of
"precedential" and "persuasive" authority are not so crystalline and distinct that a rule
distinguishing between them could be enforced. On the one hand, there are various levels
of precedent. On the other, the "persuasive" effect of any prior decision may be impossible
to disentangle, in the mind of a common law judge, from the fact that it is a prior
decision-and hence, in fact, a precedent. See Barnett, supra n. 2, at 9-12.
120. Alito Memorandum, supra n. 110, at 28.
121. Id. (emphasis in original).
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mean? If a circuit's rule provides-as several do' 22-that
unpublished opinions may be cited only for their "persuasive"
value, is that not a "restriction" on their citation? One might
think so. And if so, it would follow that circuit rules limiting
citation to persuasive value are forbidden by Rule 32.1, because
no such limit is imposed on the citation of published opinions.1
2
1
Two possible remedies come to mind. One is legislative
history, or drafter's gloss. The Committee Note might declare
the committee's view that the Rule deals only with citability and
"says nothing whatsoever about the effect that a court must
give" to the cited opinions.' 24 If we may assume that the judges
and lawyers operating in the federal appellate courts have no
aversion to legislative history,' 25 this approach might produce the
committee's desired interpretation of its Rule.
The other approach would proceed on the basis that if you
want to permit citation, you might just say that citation is
permitted. 126 Draft B thus would simply provide:
Any opinion, order, judgment, or other disposition by a
federal court may be cited to or by any court.
This language would make quite clear the committee's
view that the Rule deals only with permitting citation and says
nothing about the weight to be given citations. Draft B also
would take the lead out of the drafting. You don't have to be
Bryan Garner to object to the present draft's double negative
("[n]o prohibition)"; its vast passive ("may be imposed"); its
122. See supra n. 117.
123. In an apparent effort to avoid this problem, the committee minimizes the
differences that exist among the circuits with respect to the weight given to citations of
unpublished opinions, downplaying in particular the extent to which those opinions are
treated as precedents. Thus, the committee says that "the circuits have differed
dramatically with respect to the restrictions that they have placed upon the citation of
'unpublished' opinions for their persuasive value," Alito Memorandum, supra n. 110, at
31, without mentioning that the circuits have differed even more dramatically with respect
to the restrictions they have placed on citation of unpublished opinions for their
precedential value, see supra n. 117.
124. Alito Memorandum, supra n. 110, at 28.
125. But see e.g. Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the
Law (Amy Gutman ed., Princeton U. Press 1997).
126. The committee does just say that in the two-word preamble to its Rule: "Citation
permitted." This language does not seem operational, however, because it does not say
citation of what is permitted. Instead, the drafters turn to a prohibitory approach and forbid
any "prohibition or restriction" on citation. Under this approach, to know what is
permitted you have to know what is a "prohibition or restriction."
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awkward laundry list of unpublished dispositions; or its
backhanded approach of making opinions citable by banning
restrictions on citation.
Before concluding, however, that the elegant Draft B
should replace the committee's cumbersome Draft A, it is
necessary to consider how each draft would handle a major
problem that will arise.
D. Discouraging Words
This is the problem of discouraging words. Although nine
of the thirteen circuits now allow citation of their unpublished
opinions, all nine discourage the practice; they all have language
in their rules stating that such citation is "disfavored," that
unpublished opinions should not be cited unless no published
opinion would serve as well, that the court "sees no precedential
value" in unpublished opinions, and so forth.'27 The question is
whether such discouraging words are a forbidden "restriction"
on citation under proposed Rule 32.1.
The Advisory Committee addresses this question with the
following Delphic pronouncement:
Unlike many of the local rules of the courts of appeals,
Rule 32.1(a) does not provide that citing "unpublished"
opinions is "disfavored" or limited to particular
circumstances (such as when no "published" opinion
adequately addresses an issue). Again, it is difficult to
understand why "unpublished" opinions should be subject
to restrictions that do not apply to other sources."'
The first sentence of this passage does not say that Rule
32.1 would overrule those local rules-only that it is "[u]nlike"
them. The second sentence, however, characterizes the
discouraging words as "restrictions," so in the committee's
apparent view, Rule 32.1 would overrule them.
Four questions follow: (1) Are discouraging words
"restrictions" on citation under Rule 32.1 ? (2) What difference,
if any, does it make? (3) What is the risk of judicial resistance to
127. See supra nn. 8-15.
128. Alito Memorandum, supra n. 110, at 34.
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no-citation rules, through discouraging words or other means?
and (4) Should discouraging words be forbidden?
1. Are Discouraging Words "Restrictions" under Rule 32.1 ?
The committee's statement notwithstanding, it is not clear
that discouraging words have to be considered "restrictions" on
citation under the proposed Rule 32.1. These words may be
wholly admonitory-and unenforceable. The Fourth Circuit's
rule, for example, states that citing unpublished opinions is
"disfavored," but that it may be done "[i]f counsel believes,
nevertheless, that [an unpublished opinion] has precedential
value in relation to a material issue in a case and that there is no
published opinion that would serve as well." 129 On the question
of what counsel "believes," surely counsel should be taken at
her word; counsel's asserted belief that an unpublished opinion
has precedential or persuasive value should not be considered a
falsifiable fact. Hence no sanction should be available for
violating the Fourth Circuit's rule, and the rule's discouraging
language in turn would not be a "prohibition or restriction" that
was barred by Rule 32.1 as presently drafted.
In the rules of some other circuits, however, the language
disfavoring citation of unpublished opinions is unmoored from
anyone's "belief' and arguably does impose an objective
"prohibition or restriction" determinable by a court.1 30 A court
might find, for example, that the required "persuasive value
with respect to a material issue that has not been addressed in a
published opinion" 131 was not present, and hence that the citation
was not permitted by the circuit rule.
With what result? It would follow, paradoxically, that the
opinion could be cited-because the circuit rule would be struck
down under Rule 32.1 as a forbidden "restriction" on citation.
The committee's double-negative drafting thus creates a
Hall of Mirrors in which citation of an unpublished opinion
129. See supra n. 9.
130. The Tenth Circuit's rule, for example, states that although citation of unpublished
opinions is "disfavored," such an opinion may be cited if"(1) it has persuasive value with
respect to a material issue that has not been addressed in a published opinion; and (2) it
would assist the court in its disposition." See supra n. 13. There is nothing here about what
counsel "believes."
131. See supra n. 130.
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would be allowed either way. If the local rule's discouraging
language is merely hortatory, it is not a "restriction" forbidden
by Rule 32.1; but that doesn't matter, because such a rule does
not bar the citation in the first place. If, on the other hand, the
local rule's language has bite and is a "restriction," then Rule
32.1 strikes it down, and again the citation is permitted.
2. What Difference Does It Make Whether Discouraging Words
Are "Restrictions"?
There is one live question, however, that would turn on
whether a local rule's discouraging language constituted a
"restriction" on citation. If the language was a restriction, it
would be condemned by Rule 32.132 and so presumably would
have to be removed from the local circuit rule. Each circuit's
rule thus would have to be parsed to determine whether its
discouraging words were purely hortatory or legally
enforceable; and each circuit thus would have to decide-
subject to review by the Judicial Conference?-which of its
discouraging words it could keep.
This not only would present each circuit with a tricky job
of drafting or redrafting. More importantly, imposing this task
on the circuits, and thus invalidating many of their existing
rules, could well forfeit the political support from the circuits
that Rule 32.1 needs to survive the Judicial Conference and its
committees.
Here again, Draft B may come to the rescue. Its simple
statement that unpublished opinions "may be cited" would
trump whatever a local rule might say to disfavor or discourage
citation. There would thus be no "prohibition or restriction" on
citation and hence no need to rewrite all the local rules to
remove the discouraging words.
3. The Risk of Judicial Resistance
Before concluding that the permissive Draft B works better
than the prohibitory Draft A, however, one must ask how the
two versions would stand up, respectively, to possible
opposition by adamant anti-citationists. The committee
132. That Rule, of course, provides that "no prohibition or restriction may be imposed."
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reportedly chose the prohibitory Draft A over a permissive Draft
B out of concern that, the Rule's permission notwithstanding, a
recalcitrant circuit might impose some "prohibition or
restriction" that would make it difficult or impossible for
attorneys to cite unpublished opinions."' This fear of a rogue
circuit defying duly adopted Federal Rules seems overblown (if
not fantastic).
A circuit might more plausibly react, however, not by
restricting attorneys in what they can cite, but by restricting the
circuit judges themselves. The Third Circuit, for example, while
allowing attorneys to cite unpublished opinions, has an
announced "tradition" that it will not itself cite those
opinions. 134
It might be said that such foreswearance by judges should
not bother lawyers, who remain free to cite unpublished
opinions to the judges. But surely a lawyer's chance of
prevailing in her case is greater if the judge can cite the authority
on which the lawyer and the judge rely. In practice, then, a
court's policy of not itself citing unpublished opinions may
undermine the right of attorneys to cite those opinions. So if a
rule is adopted that allows citation of unpublished opinions,
policies by which courts foreswear citing those opinions should
be eliminated.
For this purpose, the committee's more explicit Draft A
might be more effective than my Draft B.'35 No explicit
command should be needed, however. Federal circuit judges can
be expected to obey the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,
and to do so in spirit as well as in letter. It therefore should be
sufficient, if a rule is adopted stating that unpublished opinions
"may be cited," to include in the Committee Note a statement
133. It reportedly has been suggested, for example, that a circuit's local rule might
require permission of the court clerk before citing one of the court's unpublished opinions.
134. See 3d Cir. I.O.P. 5.7 ("The court by tradition does not cite to its not precedential
opinions as authority." ); see also supra n. 8.
135. Draft A presumably would ban the Third Circuit's "tradition" of non-citation,
deeming it a forbidden "prohibition" or "restriction." Draft B, stating only that
unpublished opinions "may be cited," would not on its face strike down self-imposed
practices of not citing.
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that judicial policies, practices, or traditions of not citing such




4. Should Discouraging Words Be Allowed?
Finally, whether or not discouraging words would violate
Rule 32.1, there remains the normative question whether such
words should be allowed to persist in a circuit's rules. The
Advisory Committee apparently thinks not, embracing equal
rights for published and unpublished opinions.37 I disagree.
Discouraging words have been adopted by all the circuits-and
many of the states-that allow citation of unpublished opinions,
and I think with reason. Unpublished opinions are different from
published ones. This is partly because the courts give them
"published" status in traditional case reporters, but more
importantly, because unpublished rulings do not get as much
attention and consideration from judges as published rulings do.
Given these differences, courts treat unpublished opinions as
second-class precedents in various ways-for example, by
regarding them as citable only for "persuasive" value and not as
precedents. If unpublished opinions may be treated that way
after they have been decided, the same logic indicates that
136. If a more explicit approach is considered necessary, an effective one can be found
short of Draft A. One could retain Draft B-
(1) Any opinion; order, judgment, or other disposition by a federal court may be
cited to or by any court -
and add a second paragraph:
2) No federal court may decline to consider or to cite any judicial disposition on
the ground that such disposition has been designated as "unpublished," "not for
publication," "non-precedential," "not precedent," or the like.
This approach, no less than Draft A, would expressly invalidate the no-citation-by-
judges policy now existing in the Third Circuit, as well as any such policies or rules that
might be devised in the future to undermine citability. (The Third Circuit judges avowedly
"decline to... cite" opinions because they are unpublished.) At the same time, the new
language would be limited to judicial words or actions that specifically "decline to
consider or to cite" any disposition on the ground of its being unpublished. This language
would avoid the vagueness of the term "restriction" in the present Draft A; it thus would
avoid having to parse the discouraging words in each circuit's rule to determine whether
those words represent a "restriction" and have to be removed.
137. "[I]t is difficult to understand why 'unpublished' opinions should be subject to
restrictions that do not apply to other sources." Alito Memorandum, supra n. 110, at 34.
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citation of those opinions may be discouraged beforehand-as
long as the citation is allowed.'38
In the longer term, the discouraging words are likely to
prove needless. As the Advisory Committee points out, citing an
unpublished opinion "is usually tantamount to admitting that no
'published' opinion supports a contention, [so] parties already
have an incentive not to cite 'unpublished' opinions." '39 But as
long as the local rule's admonitions against citation are only
admonitions, so the decision on citation remains wholly and
freely up to the lawyer, no harm appears in letting circuits
maintain the second-class status of unpublished opinions. If
words discouraging citation will reassure judges and lawyers as
they venture into a new world of citable judicial opinions,
toleration of such comforting judicial speech is not too high a
price to pay.
IV. CONCLUSION
The citadel of no-citation rules is falling. There is a clear
trend, both in the individual federal circuits and in the states,
toward abandoning those rules. Nine of the thirteen circuits now
allow citation of unpublished opinions. And while a majority of
the states still prohibit such citation, the margin is slim and
dwindling. Rule 32.1, proposed by the Federal Rules Advisory
Committee, accords with this trend and deserves the support of
the legal profession.
At the same time, the Rule's drafting should be
reconsidered. Its double-negative approach-forbidding any
"prohibition or restriction" on citation-should be replaced
with a statement that unpublished opinions "may be cited." This
change would make it clear that the forbidden "restriction[s]"
do not include local circuit rules stating either (a) that
unpublished opinions may be cited only for "persuasive value,"
or (b) that citation of unpublished opinions is "disfavored," or
the like, or should not be done unless there is no published
opinion that serves as well (" discouraging words"). Discretion
138. See also Barnett, supra n. 2, at 22 (in defense of treating unpublished opinions as
second-class precedents).
139. Alito Memorandum, supra n. 110, at 34.
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to employ statements of both kinds should be left, for now, to
the individual circuits. The Advisory Committee is correct,
however, on the fundamental proposition that decisions of the
federal courts should be citable in those courts.
No-CITATION RULES UNDER SIEGE
APPENDIX
State Court Rules on Citation of Unpublished Opinions 2003
I II III IV V
All Opinions Citable as Citable for Too Close to Citation Prohibited
Freely Precedent Persuasive Value Call
Citable*
Connecticut Delaware Alaska Hawaii Alabama Arizona
Mississippi Ohio Georgia Illinois Arkansas
New York Texas Iowa Maine California
North Dakota Utah Kansas Oklahoma Colorado
West Virginia Michigan Oregon District of Columbia
Minnesota Florida Idaho














4 5 12 5 25
21 Citation States 25 No-Citation
States
These states either publish all opinions or place no restrictions on the citation of
unpublished opinions.

